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ABSTRACT
We analyse the effects of inflation and growth uncertainty on the 
monetary policy reaction function of the Central Bank Republic of 
Turkey (C.B.R.T.), considering possible asymmetries in the reaction 
function over the business cycle. We follow Bec, Salem, and Collard’s 
approach in order to specify an asymmetric reaction function 
suggesting that central banker interventions are influenced by 
business cycles. Our results reveal that the C.B.R.T. has asymmetric 
preferences. We find that the C.B.R.T. targets inflation stabilisation, 
both in recession and expansion periods. Moreover, the C.B.R.T. reacts 
more aggressively to any inflation gap during recessions than it does 
during expansions. On the other hand, the C.B.R.T. tries to smooth 
fluctuations in output, both during recessions and expansions. 
We further discover that the C.B.R.T. reacts to inflation and growth 
uncertainties more aggressively in expansion periods.
1. Introduction
Since the seminal work of Taylor (1993), the monetary policy reaction function has devel-
oped in a linear framework, ignoring possible asymmetries of central banker preferences. 
Recent studies, however, provide theoretical foundations for asymmetry in the reaction 
function of monetary authorities. The linear monetary policy rule is based mainly on two 
assumptions, namely, that the central bank has a quadratic loss function, and that the Phillips 
curve is linear. According to the first assumption, central banks tend to behave symmetri-
cally, and with the same magnitude to positive or negative deviations of the inflation and 
output gaps from their target values. Recently, however, it has been argued that policymakers 
may have asymmetric preferences with respect to inflation and output gaps (Bec, Salem, 
& Collard, 2002). Cukierman (2000, 2002) has suggested that while credible central banks 
are averse to negative output gaps, as well as to deviations in inflation from the target, they 
are not equally averse to positive output gaps. One explanation for this behaviour is that, 
although most central banks are regarded as independent, if they are accountable to elected 
officials, their interventions may be influenced by the business cycle. Since the welfare losses 
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caused by business cycles can be asymmetric (Cukierman, 2000; Gali et al., 2007), central 
bankers may have a greater aversion to recessions than they do to expansions. In other 
words, central banks exhibit greater sensitivity to output gap deviations than they do to 
deviations of inflation from their respective target levels in recession periods. Furthermore, 
they exhibit a greater reaction to deviations of inflation in expansion periods. With regard 
to the second assumption, it is recognised that the short-term inflation–output trade-off 
may be nonlinear. This implies a nonlinear Phillips curve; that is, positive demand shocks 
are more inflationary than negative shocks are disinflationary. Orphanides and Wieland 
(2000) and Dolado et al. (2004) state that, combined with a quadratic loss function, the 
optimal monetary policy is also nonlinear. Central banks may tend to increase interest rates 
by relatively more when inflation is above target than they will reduce them when inflation 
is below target. Goodhart (1999) has argued that central banks trying to establish credibility 
would prefer to have below-target inflation.
In this study, we consider possible nonlinearities in the monetary policy reaction func-
tion, as well as examining uncertainty. The main assumption is that policymakers can 
accurately determine the current values of the inflation and output gaps when they set the 
interest rate. Owing to measurement difficulties, however, policymakers cannot determine 
the true state of the economy. That is, central banks face many kinds of uncertainty when 
they formulate their policies. We analyse the effects of inflation and growth uncertainties 
on the monetary policy reaction function, considering possible asymmetries in the reaction 
function over the business cycles.
Previous studies on uncertainty generally investigate its effect through output and infla-
tion on the coefficients of the optimal monetary policy rule. These studies show that if the 
uncertainty in one variable increases, the policymaker should respond less to movements 
in that variable. In other words, an increase in inflation uncertainty reduces the optimal 
inflation coefficient, and increases the output-gap coefficient in a Taylor rule, and vice 
versa (e.g. Aoki, 2003; Martın & Mılas, 2009; Peersman & Smets, 1999; Rudebusch, 2001; 
Smets, 1999). Other studies consider the effect of inflation uncertainty on interest rates. 
Arguments such as loanable funds theory and market frictions posit a negative relationship 
between inflation uncertainty and nominal interest rates (e.g. Frankel & Lown, 1994; Jorda 
& Salyer, 2003; Juster & Wachtel, 1972a, 1972b; Juster & Taylor, 1975). On the other hand, 
portfolio theory, the Fisher hypothesis, and term structure theory suggest a positive rela-
tionship between inflation uncertainty and nominal interest rates (Chan, 1994; Cox et al., 
1981; Fama, 1975; Markowitz, 1952). Although there is no definite evidence on the effects 
of inflation uncertainty on nominal interest rates, the above arguments suggest that uncer-
tainty is a key element in monetary policy and, hence, should be considered in empirical 
models of such a policy.
The objective of this study is to estimate the monetary policy reaction function of the 
C.B.R.T. over the period 2002–2015, using monthly data. In light of the above arguments, we 
use an asymmetric reaction function, extending the analysis to include growth and inflation 
uncertainty. In contrast to previous studies, we focus directly on the parameters of growth 
and inflation uncertainty. To the best of our knowledge, Öge Güney (2016) is the only other 
study to consider output and inflation uncertainty for Turkey. While the latter study uses a 
linear framework, we, however, regard monetary policy as being implemented potentially 
differently in expansionary and recessionary periods. In this respect, we use the output 
gap as a transition variable to capture any asymmetry in the implementation of monetary 
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policy. In this sense, this paper is a continuation of the research of Öge Güney (2016). Thus, 
our reaction function departs from Taylor’s original specification in two respects. First, we 
include growth and inflation uncertainty as explanatory variables. Second, our specification 
depends on the state of the economy.
In the literature, most studies estimate the reaction function of the C.B.R.T. from a 
linear perspective (Berument & Malatyalı, 2000; Berument & Taşçi, 2004; Gozgor, 2012; 
Omay & Hasanov, 2006). An exception is the work of Hasanov and Omay (2008), who 
examine possible nonlinearities in the reaction function of the C.B.R.T. for the period 
1990–2000. During this pre-inflation-targeting period, Turkey implemented various sta-
bilisation programmes, and the results of their study support the asymmetric behaviour of 
the C.B.R.T. Our study departs from that of Hasanov and Omay (2008) by focusing on the 
inflation-targeting period. The C.B.R.T. adopted implicit inflation targeting from January 
2002 to December 2005, and began implementing the explicit inflation-targeting regime 
in January 2006. During the implementation and transition process to inflation targeting, 
some institutional infrastructure needed to be adjusted. In this framework, instrument 
independence was reinforced in April 2001, and the primary objective of the bank was 
stated as being ensuring price stability. The central bank and the government jointly deter-
mined the inflation targets. Since the global crisis adversely affected the Turkish economy, 
causing negative G.D.P. growth and significant increases in unemployment, the C.B.R.T. 
designed and launched a new policy strategy at the end of 2010. According to this strategy, 
the overall scope of inflation targeting was revised, and financial stability was adopted as a 
supplementary objective (Kara, 2012). In the inflation-targeting regime, lower uncertainty 
is required in order to provide a credible monetary policy (Clarida et al., 1999; Johnson, 
2002). In light of these developments, it might be interesting to determine whether the 
C.B.R.T.’s response was affected by business cycles during the inflation-targeting regime. In 
addition, we analyse whether the C.B.R.T. have reached their objectives, such as smoothing 
the fluctuations in output, during this policy regime.
The abovementioned arguments refer to an asymmetric reaction function of the mone-
tary authorities. In the present study, following Bec et al. (2002), Ruge-Murcia (2004), and 
Nobay and Peel (2003), we assume that nonlinearity in the monetary reaction function 
arises from asymmetric central bank preferences. As argued by Cukierman (2000), central 
banks are not totally insensitive to political concerns and, hence, this type of asymmetry 
may appear in the loss function of the central bank. Thus, this study analyses whether the 
monetary policy of the C.B.R.T. is influenced by political concerns. We believe that the 
results provide useful evidence for understanding the consequences of monetary policy.
We test the presence of asymmetries in the monetary policy reaction function of the 
C.B.R.T. using the generalised method of moments (G.M.M.). Our estimations provide 
strong evidence of asymmetric behaviour by the C.B.R.T. We find that the C.B.R.T. targets 
inflation stabilisation both in recession and expansion periods. Moreover, the C.B.R.T. reacts 
more aggressively to any inflation gap during recessions than it does during expansions. 
On the other hand, the C.B.R.T. tries to smooth fluctuations in output during recessions. 
We further discover that the C.B.R.T. reacts to inflation and growth uncertainty more 
aggressively in expansion periods.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, and 
Section 3 summarises the monetary policy of the C.B.R.T. Section 4 reports the empirical 
model, with Section 5 presenting the data and empirical results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2. Literature review
The above arguments reveal possible asymmetry in the preferences of the central bank. 
Several studies test the nonlinearity in policy reaction functions with respect to asymmetric 
central bank preferences. Kim et al. (2002) find evidence supporting a nonlinear monetary 
policy rule in the U.S., explained partly by possible asymmetries in the Federal Reserve’s 
(Fed)  reactions to inflation and output gaps. Dolado et al. (2005) provide empirical evi-
dence of a nonlinear monetary policy reaction function in the U.S. They show that over the 
post-1982 period, the Fed more heavily weighted positive inflation deviations than they did 
negative deviations. Surico (2007) also finds asymmetric preferences of the Fed with respect 
to the output gap before 1979. He shows that the reaction of the interest rate to an output 
contraction is stronger than the reaction to an output expansion of the same magnitude. 
Gerlach (2000) shows that U.S. monetary authorities may have been more concerned with 
negative rather than positive output gaps. Surico (2003) states that European Central Bank 
(E.C.B.) monetary policy is characterised by a nonlinear policy rule, and finds evidence of 
asymmetric responses to movements in output.
Some studies state that central bank interventions are influenced by the business cycle 
(measured by the output gap). Bec et al. (2002) provide evidence that the behaviour of the 
monetary policy in the U.S., France and Germany varies over the business cycle. For exam-
ple, the Fed and the Bundesbank are only concerned about inflation during expansionary 
periods. Similarly, Bouabdallah and Olmedo (2000) find evidence that U.S. monetary policy 
exhibits more aggressive behaviour toward inflation in expansion periods than it does in 
recession periods, and that there is greater concern about output stabilisation in recession 
periods. Brüggemann and Riedel (2011) state that the policy of the Bank of England depends 
on the state of the economy, demonstrating that in recessionary periods, the U.K. monetary 
authorities put more weight on the output gap and less on inflation.
In addition to possible asymmetries in the reaction function, another important issue 
with regard to the conduct of monetary policy is uncertainty. Several studies examine why 
the central bank should respond to uncertainty. Montes (2010, p. 95) states that ‘in modern 
economies, expectations play a decisive role as a transmission mechanism of monetary pol-
icies’. Similarly, Berument (1999) suggests that if a central bank’s anti-inflationary policies 
are not credible, realised inflation will not decline and, thus, nor will inflation expectations. 
This results in a large forecast error, and, thus, inflation uncertainty. If policymakers respond 
to inflation uncertainty by increasing the interest rate, this provides an alternative trans-
mission mechanism between anti-inflationary monetary policies and the output level. In 
addition, the literature on ‘hysteresis under uncertainty’ (see Dixit & Pindyck, 1994) asserts 
that uncertainty matters for the transmission of monetary policy. In the literature, there is 
a consensus that the sign of the impact of uncertainty on investment-type decisions is not 
ambiguous (Caballero, 1991). According to the option value approach, under uncertainty, 
those firms ready to invest are reluctant to do so, while those that tend to invest delay their 
decisions as well. Therefore, eliminating uncertainty does not lead to an ambiguous effect on 
investment. In this sense, the causal relationship between monetary policy and investment 
gets looser (Belke & Kronen, 2016; Belke et al., 2005).1 These arguments suggest that the 
impact of uncertainty on the relation between the interest rate and investment is important 
for the transmission of monetary policy. If investment is negatively affected by uncertainty, 
central banks’ responses intending to eliminate uncertainty may have a positive effect on 
investment.
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While we consider the uncertainty in macroeconomic variables, economic policy uncer-
tainty is also likely to have an impact on the monetary policy reaction function.2 The effect 
of political uncertainty on the economy through consumption spending (Baker et al., 2015) 
and financial constraints (Amiti & Weinstein, 2011; Belke & Verheyen, 2014; Manzo, 2013; 
Pástor & Varonesi, 2011) are discussed in the literature. Policy uncertainty in a country can 
also be related to policy uncertainty prevailing in the other countries (e.g. important trade 
partners) beyond uncertainty in the domestic country (Belke & Cui, 2010; Belke & Gros, 
2005; Colombo, 2013). Furthermore, policy uncertainty in related countries tends to quickly 
transform into uncertainty in the domestic country, and may even change domestic govern-
ance structures. These arguments assert that central banks no longer decide policy rates in an 
independent way, and that their decisions are increasingly being affected by the international 
environment (Taylor, 2013). For example, Kim (2000) and Belke and Gros (2005) show that 
U.S. monetary policy can affect the behaviour of other central banks. In addition, central 
banks may adjust the interest rate in response to an exchange rate appreciation, and their 
behaviour is also affected by the reactions of other central banks (Beckmann et al., 2014).
Several studies have investigated the effects of uncertainty on the coefficients in the Taylor 
rule. Smets (1999) estimates the effect of output gap uncertainty on the monetary policy 
rule of the U.S. economy, showing that output gap uncertainty reduces the response to the 
output gap. Similarly, Martın and Mılas (2009) show that U.S. monetary policy responds 
less to inflation and to the output gap when these variables are more uncertain for the U.S. 
Peersman and Smets (1999) find that an estimation error in the output gap reduces the 
coefficient of output in a Taylor rule for five E.U. countries. Swanson (2004) shows that 
increases in uncertainty about a variable weaken policymakers’ responsiveness to that var-
iable. In addition, some studies investigate the effects of inflation uncertainty on interest 
rates within the Fisher hypothesis framework. For example, Berument et al. (2005) show 
that inflation uncertainty is important in explaining interest rates in the U.K. Omay and 
Hasanov (2010) suggest a negative relationship between inflation uncertainty and the inter-
est rate in the U.S. They also show that this relationship is regime-dependent and greater 
in low-inflation periods.
A number of studies have estimated the monetary policy reaction function for Turkey. 
Berument and Malatyalı (2000) and Berument and Taşçi (2004) estimated the reaction 
function of the C.B.R.T. within a linear specification. Berument and Malatyalı (2000) state 
that the C.B.R.T. is concerned about the lagged inflation rate, rather than the future rate, 
and implemented an output-targeting policy during the period July 1989–March 1997. 
Berument and Taşçi (2004) conclude that the C.B.R.T. focused on output stability rather 
than inflation in the period January 1990–October 2000. Omay and Hasanov (2006) state 
that backward-looking models explain the C.B.R.T.’s reaction function for the period January 
1990–December 2003. They find that, while the aim of expansionary monetary policy is to 
stabilise output, contractionary policies aim to reduce the inflation rate. Gozgor (2012) finds 
that the reaction function of the C.B.R.T. can be explained by the Taylor rule specification 
in inflation targeting. Hasanov and Omay (2008) find empirical evidence of asymmetric 
behaviour of the C.B.R.T. for the period 1990–2000. According to their results, the C.B.R.T. 
reacted to output deviations more aggressively in recession periods. Öge Güney (2016) 
estimates a reaction function that includes both inflation and output growth uncertainty. 
The results suggest that the C.B.R.T. is concerned mainly with price stability, and responds 
significantly to both inflation and growth uncertainty.
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In light of the above arguments, we test whether the reaction function of the C.B.R.T. is 
affected by business cycles. In addition, we include growth and inflation uncertainty in our 
forward-looking version of the Taylor rule in order to determine whether the reactions to 
uncertainty in macroeconomic variables differ during periods of expansion and recession.
3. Monetary policy of the C.B.R.T.
The Turkish economy experienced high and volatile inflation during the 1990s and the 
beginning of the 2000s. The primary cause of the inflation was the need to finance high 
budget deficits. The inflation rate reached its highest level of 107.3% in 1994, and its lowest 
level of 6.16% in 2012. Turkey went through two economic crises during that period, in 
1994, and again in 2001. Turkish economic output declined by 6.1% in 1994 and by 5.7% 
in 2001. Additionally, the global financial crisis caused G.D.P. to decline by 4.8% in 2009 
(see Table 1).
The C.B.R.T. has implemented several monetary programmes to keep inflation under 
control. In 1999, they adopted an exchange rate-based stabilisation programme supported 
by the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.). In addition to exchange rate targeting, the 
programme specified the implementation of various structural reforms. Owing to the failure 
of the government to implement these reforms effectively, however, the credibility of the 
stabilisation programme weakened. In addition, inflation did not fall as predicted in the pro-
gramme. This led to an appreciation of the domestic currency, and then to an increase in the 
trade deficit. Given these circumstances, the programme was abandoned in February 2001 in 
the face of speculative attacks. The Turkish economy experienced its severest economic crisis 
in 2001. The law with regard to the Turkish Central Bank was amended in April 2001, and 
the central bank had its instrument independence reinforced in terms of monetary policy 
implementation. The primary objective of the bank was stated as ensuring price stability. 
Since then, the central bank and the government jointly determine the inflation targets. 
Turkey adopted implicit inflation targeting from January 2002 to December 2005. During 
this period, an attempt was made to satisfy the necessary preconditions for implementing an 
explicit inflation-targeting regime (Öge Güney, 2016). Some reforms, such as restructuring 
the banking system, fiscal reforms and structural reforms, were indeed realised, and the 
budget deficit/G.D.P. fell from 11.5% in 2002 to 0.61% in 2006 (see Table 1).
The explicit inflation-targeting regime was implemented in January 2006. The C.B.R.T. 
used the short-term interest rate as a primary instrument for implementing its disinfla-
tion policy. The inflation-targeting regime has been largely efficient, with the inflation rate 
declining from 29.7% in 2002 to 8.8% in 2015. In addition, the Turkish economy grew at 
quite rapid rates in the years before the most recent crisis. The average growth rate of the 
Turkish economy between 2002 and 2007 was 6.8%. The economy was adversely affected by 
the subsequent global crisis, however, and the G.D.P. growth rate dropped to 0.7% in 2008, 
and by −4.8% in 2009. Furthermore, the inflation rate rose to 10.1% in 2008. Until November 
2008, the C.B.R.T. was mostly concerned about inflation, without much emphasis being 
placed on growth. During this period, the C.B.R.T. increased its policy rate with regard to 
this aspect. After November 2008, when the inflation pressure calmed down due to slowing 
aggregate demand, policy rates declined sharply (Cömert & Çolak, 2014).
The experiences of recent global economic developments reveal the importance of finan-
cial stability. Therefore, since late 2010, the C.B.R.T. has been explicitly concerned with this 
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issue. The new policy tools, such as the interest rate corridor, liquidity policies and required 
reserves, have been adopted to achieve these objectives (C.B.R.T., 2011).
4. Empirical model
As discussed above, central banks may pursue various monetary policies, depending on the 
state of the business cycle. An asymmetric monetary policy reaction function of the central 
bank is specified, as in Bec et al. (2002). They define a reaction function using a threshold 
specification. Their specification allows for an asymmetric response of the interest rate to 
both the expected inflation rate and the expected output gap. Hence, the following specifi-
cation explicitly considers the expectations of central bankers in implementing monetary 
policy
 
where d, k, j ≥ 0 and i∗t  is the targeted policy variable of the central bank. Then, πt denotes 
the inflation rate at time t; yt is the output gap, measured as the deviation of current out-







 is the expected increase in the inflation rate; and Etyt+j is the expected 
output gap. The lag of the output gap yt−d is expected to be an indicator of the business 
cycle. A negative (positive) lagged output gap implies a recessionary (an expansion) period. 
Specification 1 reflects the fact that monetary policy may be different during expansionary 
and recessionary periods.
As discussed briefly in Section 1, uncertainty is a key element of monetary policy. Hence, 
empirical models of monetary policy should take uncertainty into account. In order to 
model different interest rate reactions to uncertainty in recessionary and expansionary 
periods, we add growth and inflation uncertainty. We then extend Specification 1 as
 
where uπt is the end-of-year inflation uncertainty and ugt is the end-of-year growth uncer-
tainty. Considering that under the inflation targeting strategy, the C.B.R.T. mainly targets 
long-term inflation and does not concern itself with short-term deviations in economic 
variables, we set k and j to 12. Following Bec et al. (2002), we set d, the lag of the output 
gap in the transition function, to 1.
It is widely accepted that the official ‘dislike’ of financial instability means that monetary 
authorities adjust interest rates gradually (see Clarida et al., 2000). Therefore, we allow for 
interest rate smoothing by including two interest rate lags in the monetary policy rule, 
which is sufficient to overcome residual autocorrelation.
The model is estimated using the generalised method of moments (G.M.M.). This method 
is used to avoid possible correlation between the dependent variables and the residuals3. 
Clarida et al. (1999, 2000) state that the G.M.M. is well suited to econometric analyses of 
interest rate rules when variables that are not known by the central bank at the time of 
making the decision are used in the regression. The instrument set used in Specification 1 















+ 𝛽rEtyt+j, if yt−d ≤ 0















+ 𝛽rEtyt+j + 𝜑ru𝜋t + 𝜔rugt ifyt−d ≤ 0
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include the constant, 12 lags of interest rate, an output gap, the inflation rate, annual changes 
in the nominal exchange rate and the annual M1 growth. These are the most important var-
iables for the dynamics of inflation in Turkey (see Andıç et al., 2015; Civcir & Akçağlayan, 
2010; Özdemir & Saygılı, 2009). Therefore we choose these variables as instruments. The 
instrument list used to estimate Specification 2 is complemented with three lags of inflation 
and growth uncertainty. We use Hansen’s J-test to test for over-identifying restrictions.4
5. Data and empirical results
Following Öge Güney (2016), we use monthly data from 2002:01 to 2015:12. The weighted 
average of the overnight interbank interest rate, the policy instrument of the C.B.R.T., is 
used as an interest rate. We use industrial production as a proxy variable, because G.D.P. 
data are not available on a monthly basis. Inflation series is the annual percentage change in 
consumer price index (C.P.I.), and the output gap is obtained by using the Hodrick–Prescott 
(H.P.) filter to the industrial production index. In the H.P. filter, we specify the smoothing 
parameter as 14,400, which is appropriate for monthly data. The C.P.I., industrial production 
and interest rate data are retrieved from I.M.F./International Financial Statistics.  Targeted 
inflation rates are obtained from the C.B.R.T. In addition, to represent inflation uncertainty 
we use the C.B.R.T.’s survey of expectations (evds.tcmb.gov.tr/index_en.html) and we take 
the series of standard deviations of the expected annual year-end C.P.I.-based inflation rate. 
Similarly, we obtain the series of standard deviations of the expected G.D.P. growth rate from 
C.B.R.T.’s database, and we use this data as a growth uncertainty. We use raw data except for 
the seasonally adjusted industrial production series. Figure 1 presents graphs of the data.
We first test for stationarity of the series, using a conventional A.D.F. test, the results of 
which are presented in Table 2.5 The results suggest that the series are stationary. The esti-
mates of the reaction function of the C.B.R.T. are reported in Table 3.6 The linearity tests 
presented at the bottom of the table show that the linearity hypothesis is rejected at the 1% 
level in both cases. This implies that the C.B.R.T.’s reaction function is affected significantly 
by the state of the business cycle.
The estimate of Specification 1 is provided in Column I of Table 3. As emphasised above, 
the linearity hypothesis is rejected. The symmetry tests show that the responses to expected 
inflation and output gaps are both responsible for the asymmetric behaviour of the C.B.R.T. 
The equality of future inflation (δe = δr) and the output gap (βe = βr) coefficients across 
regimes is rejected. We find that both sets of coefficients have the expected signs, and are 
statistically significant in recession periods. On the other hand, the C.B.R.T. considers only 
the inflation gap during expansions. Hence, the C.B.R.T. is concerned with inflationary 
pressure during economic booms. An interesting result is that the weight attached to the 
inflation gap in recessions is greater than that in expansions. That is, the C.B.R.T. seems to 
respond more aggressively to any inflation gap during recessions than it does during expan-
sions. Finally, as the estimates of the coefficients of the output gaps indicate, the response 
of the central banker to an expected output gap is asymmetric and, thus, output objectives 
evidently only matter in recessions.
After estimating Specification 1, we consider Specification 2, which includes inflation 
and growth uncertainty. The estimation results are provided in Column II. First, as the 
global specification test indicates, there is an asymmetry in the monetary policy function. 
The symmetry tests show that the equality of the coefficients of future inflation (δe = δr), 
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the expected output gap (βe = βr), inflation uncertainty (ϕe = ϕr) and growth uncertainty 
(ωe = ωr) across regimes are rejected. Secondly, according to our estimates, both δe and δr are 
significant and positive. In other words, the C.B.R.T. considers the inflation objective dur-
ing both periods. Similar to the findings for Specification 1, the C.B.R.T. seems to respond 
more aggressively to any inflation gap during recessions than it does during expansions. In 
short, the inflation target seems to have played an important role in the C.B.R.T.’s monetary 
policy. Moreover, only in recession periods is the coefficient of the output gap positive and 
statistically significant. This result is consistent with the common view that central bankers 
















































Figure 1.  Graphs of the data. (a) output gap; (b) inflation gap; (c) growth uncertainty; (d) inflation 
uncertainty; (e) interest rate. source: author.
Table 2. a.D.F. unit-root test results.
*significant at 1% significance level; **significant at 5% significance level.
source: author’s calculations.
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When we assess the reaction of the C.B.R.T. to uncertainty, we find that the response 
is asymmetric. First, the weight attached to inflation uncertainty is greater in expansions 
(ϕe = 0.122) than it is in recessions (ϕr = −0.018). While the coefficients of inflation uncer-
tainty are, however, statistically significant in expansions, they are statistically insignificant 
in recessions. This implies that the C.B.R.T. tries to combat inflation uncertainty during 
expansions. Second, the results show that the C.B.R.T. targets growth uncertainty in both 
periods. In other words, the C.B.R.T. tries to smooth fluctuations in output. The weight 
attached to growth uncertainty is greater in expansions (ωe = 0.122) than it is in recessions 
(ωr = 0.051). These results imply, in particular, that although the monetary policy authorities 
do not target output, they are concerned about growth uncertainty in expansion periods.
6. Conclusions
This study explores the possibility that the C.B.R.T.’s reaction function, including uncer-
tainty, depends on the state of the business cycle. Our results are consistent with those of 
Bec et al. (2002), Bouabdallah and Olmedo (2000) and Brüggemann and Riedel (2011), 
which state that the business cycle matters for the monetary policy.
We find that the C.B.R.T. responds to inflation and the expected output gap in recessions. 
On the other hand, the C.B.R.T. focuses on the inflation gap during expansions. Hence, 
while the C.B.R.T. is concerned about inflationary pressures during economic booms and 
recessions, it only pursues output stabilisation in recessionary periods. In addition, our 
findings suggest that the response of the central banker to inflation uncertainty is asym-
metric. Only in expansions, however, is the coefficient of inflation uncertainty statistically 
significant. Because the experience of high inflation in the Turkish economy makes public 
inflation expectations more persistent, the C.B.R.T. may expect increases in inflationary 
Table 3. Estimate of the monetary policy reaction function.
notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors of coefficient estimates. p-values of the symmetry tests and of the J-sta-
tistics are reported.
source: author’s calculations.
*significant at 1% significance level; **significant at 5% significance level.
Parameters I II
α 0.153* (0.027) 0.380* (0.054)
ρ1 1.356* (0.024) 1.244* (0.034)
ρ2 −0.381* (0.022) −0.280* (0.032)
Expansion period
δe 0.001* (0.0003) 0.001** (0.0005)
βe −0.001 (0.001) −0.002 (0.001)
ϕe − 0.122* (0.016)
ωe − −0.204* (0.036)
Recession period
δr 0.007* (0.002) 0.009* (0.002)
βr 0.002* (0.0004) 0.002* (0.0006)
ϕr − −0.018 (0.025)
ωr − 0.051* (0.012)
J-statistics 0.999 0.998
h0: δe = δr 0.006 0.001
h0: βe = βr 0.001 0.012
h0: ϕe = ϕr − 0.000
h0: ωe = ωr − 0.000
Linearity 0.001 0.000
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expectations to lead to an increase in real inflation rates. The positive coefficient implies that 
the C.B.R.T. increases the interest rate in response to increased inflation uncertainty. In other 
words, the C.B.R.T. targets inflation uncertainty. Finally, we find that the C.B.R.T. targets 
growth uncertainty in both periods, and that the response of the central banker to growth 
uncertainty is also asymmetric. In particular, while the monetary policy authorities do not 
target output in expansion periods, they do try to smooth fluctuations in output. Overall, 
our results indicate that the monetary authorities in Turkey consider economic stability to 
be a major objective, and that it is affected by business cycles. During the period analysed, 
the average inflation rate was 10.5% and the growth rate was 4.9%. Compared with those 
of previous periods, these rates imply the success of the behaviour of the C.B.R.T. If this 
asymmetric behaviour is systematic, models that consider such behaviour endogenously 
will have better explanatory power, as suggested by Neftçi (1984).
Finally, the above arguments suggest that the behaviour of the C.B.R.T., aimed at reduc-
ing uncertainty, may matter for the transmission of monetary policy. In this context, the 
impact of uncertainty on investment-type decisions for Turkey should be analysed. This 
issue is left for future research. In addition, our study focuses on the asymmetric effects of 
the C.B.R.T. policies, given uncertainty in macro variables. Policy-related uncertainty in 
Turkey, other important trade partners or the potential leader of global monetary policies, 
the U.S. Fed, are, however, likely to impact Turkish monetary policy. Therefore, this issue 
also deserves attention in future research.
Notes
1.  Belke and Goecke (2009) investigate the effectiveness of monetary policy under uncertainty.
2.  To measure economic policy uncertainty, Baker et al. (2015) construct an index based on 
newspaper articles that report on the uncertainty of economic policy.
3.  In estimation, we use heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent-hierarchical 
agglomerative clustering (H.A.C.) (Newey–West) estimators and n-step iterative method to 
define a proper weighting matrix and weight updating, respectively.
4.  We apply Jarque–Bera and Kolgomorov–Smirov tests to examine the normality of the 
estimated model. Our findings do not support normality of the model. It is argued, however, 
that a normality assumption is not required for G.M.M. model estimation (see Arbia, 2014). 
Therefore, we think that normality is not an issue for our analysis.
5.  EViews 9  is used for the computations in the empirical analysis.
6.  We tried different lag orders and variable ordering, and found that the estimates of the 
parameters are not too sensitive to changes in these two parameters.
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